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Abstract
The benefits of smoothing demand peaks in the electricity market has been widely recog-
nised. European countries such Spain and some of the Scandinavian countries have recently
given to the consumers the possibility to face the spot prices instead of having a fixed tariffs de-
termined by retailers. This paper develops a theoretical model to study the relations between
risk averse consumers, retailers and producers, both in the spot and in the forward markets
when consumers are able to choose between fixed tariffs and the wholesale prices. The model
is calibrated on a real market case - Spain - where since 2014 spot tariffs were introduced
beside the flat tariffs for household consumers. Finally, simulations of agents behavior and
markets performance, depending on consumers risk aversion and the number of producers, are
used to analyse the implications from the model.
Our results show that the quantities the retailers and the producers trade in the forward
market are positively related with the loss aversion of consumers. The quantities bought by
the retailers in the forward market are negatively related with the skewness of the spot prices.
On the contrary, quantity sold forward by producers are positively related with the skewness of
the spot prices (high probability of getting high prices increase the forward sale) and with the
total market demand. In the spot market, the degree of loss aversion of consumers determine
the quantity the retailers buy in the spot market but does not have a direct effect on the spot
prices.
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1 Introduction
In April 2014, the Spanish regulation authority (NRA) changed the pricing regime for the con-
sumers included in the ”last consumer tariff”, which involve all the household consumers who did
not opt for any specific provider in the free electricity market (about 60% of the total).1 The
NRA proposed to switch from an auction mechanism, which kept the wholesale electricity price
constant for 3 months, to the spot electricity price (CNMC, 2014b). The last auction took place
on 19th December 2013. The day after, the NRA did not validate the results of this auction,‘given
the atypical circumstances in which the auction was held’. The change in the pricing mechanism
announced for the second quarter of 2014, and the declaration of the NRA about the auction
mechanism had quite an impact on the final consumers.
Literature highlights that consumers usually prefer a flat tariff over a variable tariff either be-
cause they overestimate their future consumption due to quasi-hyperbolic discount rates (DellaVi-
gna and Malmendier, 2006) or because consumers would like to be insured against future risks and
uncertainties (Train et al. (1989) and Herweg and Mierendorff (2013)). This motivated Train et al.
(1989) to introduce the concept of ‘flat-tariff bias’, which characterize consumers who prefer a flat
tariff even through this type of tariff may be suboptimal with respect to a measured tariff. This
results is confirmed by a number of experiments both in the US (see Faruqui and Sergici (2010))
and in Europe (see Aubin et al. (1995), Filippini (1995) and Di Cosmo et al. (2014)). These
works investigate whether consumption reacts more to prices when the cost of electricity follows
wholesale costs more closely. These experiments find that there is a negative relation between
high peak prices and consumption, but the magnitude of these effects was not constant between
the experiments, varying between 3 and 6%. Reaction of consumers is typically higher in peak
times, but the estimated elasticities are quite low for the remaining hours of the day (Di Cosmo
and O‘Hora, 2017).
However, the electrification envisaged for the next years with the increase of the number of
electric vehicles and the electrification of heating and cooling systems may change the rate of
responsiveness of final consumers to real prices. The option for the consumers to choose between
real time tariffs and a flat rate has been applied not only in Spain but also in Norway and Sweden.2
To have an idea about the interest of consumers in the announcement made by the Government
to swap the default tariff for consumers from the auction to the spot price, we analysed the number
of searches done by Spanish consumers on internet for the term ‘Electricity Price’. The main
intuition is that not only consumers under the default tariff but also the other consumers may
be interested in switching from flat to spot prices. Figure 1 shows that consumers actively look
for electricity prices between December 2013 (when the auction mechanism got suspended) and in
1Only to low-voltage consumers who have a power supply of less than 10kW.
2See CNMC (2014b) and Olsen and Johnsen (2011).
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April 2014 (when he spot price was set as default option). Also, after April 2014 the number of
searches have always been higher that when the price was fixed, with some peaks when the news
announced high price levels in the spot market.
Figure 1: Google trend on ‘Electricity Price’ search in Spain, 2011-2016
Although data from Google trend cannot be grouped by the socio-economic characteristics of
the consumers, Figure 1 gives an idea about the effects of the change made by the Government,
and make interesting to check how the Spanish market can change in the near future, following
the change in tariff proposed by the NRA.
The attention devoted to the change in regime proposed by the Spanish authority suggests that
at least some of the Spanish consumers not under the default tariff may opt for the spot price in
the future, or switch back to the default tariff. 3 As a result, consumers facing spot prices are
likely to be the the majority of the market in the near future.
With most of the consumers buying at the spot price, also retailers are affected by the change
in the market design, as they are not able to sell most of their electricity at a fixed price to the
final consumers, passing-through them the forward contracts. Thus, liquidity in this market may
decrease. Finally, producers may be affected as well as a consequence of market changes and their
relations with both retailers and consumers.Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) highlights that
producers and retailers are linked not only in the spot, but also in the forward markets. Retailers
who sell electricity to consumers at a fixed price hedge their position in the forward market , buying
electricity from producers who wish to hedge against uncertainty (Deng and Oren, 2006).
This paper focuses on the relation between consumers, producers and retailers in a market in
which is possible for consumers to buy at the spot price. In particular, we analyse the consequences
of loss-averse consumers in both the spot and the forward markets and investigate the implications
of consumer preferences on the liquidity of forward markets.
This is particularly interesting as a wide literature has investigated the impact of liquid forward
markets on competition in the spot markets, as summarized by Di Cosmo and Lynch (2016).
3By law, consumers are allowed to change tariff scheme once a year.
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Green and Newbery (1992), Allaz and Vila (1993), Wolak (2000) and Borenstein (2002) show how,
under some conditions, forward liquidity forces the producers to keep the prices in the spot at a
competitive level.
We extend the analysis of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) in order to include loss-averse
consumers. First, we set up a theoretical model to describe the relations between consumers,
producers and retailers both in the spot and in the forward markets. Second, we calibrate the
results of our model on the Spanish data, in order to estimate the effects of the change in the tariff
structure on both the forward and the spot markets. Third, we investigate how changes in the loss
aversion of consumers, in the number of producers (and retailers) affect prices and quantities in
both the spot and the forward markets.
Our results show that an increase of consumers willing to buy at the spot price negatively
affects liquidity in the forward market. However, increases in the number of producers reduce both
the spot and the forward prices and increase the quantities traded in the forward market.
This paper continues by describing and solving our model in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
Spanish market and calibrates the model on the Spanish data. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) identify the optimization problem of retailers and electricity
producers both in the spot and in the forward market. In our model, we complete this scheme
introducing consumers, who can choose whether to buy electricity from the spot market (at the
spot price pW ) or buy from retailers the electricity at a fixed price pR. In the forward market,
retailers and producers contract the quantities that should be sold (bought) forward. In the spot
market, consumers maximise their utility, determining the quantity of electricity that they buy
in the spot market and at the fixed price. This choice takes into account the spot prices and
also the loss aversion of the consumers. Producers determine the quantity to produce in the spot
market taking into account the quantity sold to the retailers in the forward market. Producers and
retailers have the incentive to sell at a flat tariff pR in order to hedge their position in the forward
market. Consumers’ preference for a flat tariff may be explained as rational behaviour if they want
to insure themselves against the risks associated with changes in tariffs, when future consumption
is uncertain (Train et al., 1989). Based on the seminar work of prospect theory by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) highlight that standard risk aversion fails to
explain the insurance motive, as price variations are small compared with consumers’ income. As
a result, they introduce the concept of ”expectation-risk aversion” that we follow in this work. A
consumer is loss adverse in the sense that he incurs in a loss when the price is higher than the
reference price the consumers have in mind. In the extreme scenarios in which all the consumers
want to pay the spot prices, retailers just operates in the forward market. For simplicity, we
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assume that producers, consumers and retailers buy and sell only a baseload product. We discuss
the implications of this in section 3.
2.1 Spot market
We solve the model backward, starting from the spot market in which consumers, retailers and
generators maximise their utilities taking the prices and the quantities determined in the forward
market as given. In section 2.2, we solve the forward market using the spot results.
2.1.1 Consumers
Following Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) we assume that the consumers take as reference price
the fixed price they had in their past bills (pR). The reference price pR should reflect both the
fixed costs of the producers F and the retailers’ hedging premium.
Thus, the utility function of the consumers is of the type u−µ in which µ = λ(max(T −pR, 0))
where T is the tariff the consumer has to pay for the electricity and λ is the parameter that reflects
the degree of the consumer’s loss aversion.
When λ = 0 the preferences of the consumer are loss neutral, as they do not take into account
the reference price. When λ > 0 consumers are loss averse, as they compare the wholesale price
they face with the reference price and then determine the relative cost they face with the wholesale
price. The utility function of the i-th consumer is of the type:
u(qCi) = θqCi − 12(qCi)
2 − F − pW ∗ qCi − λpW ∗ qCi (1)
where θ = 2 ∗ λ ∗ pW + (1 − λ) ∗ (qD + pW )
2.1.2 Retailers
Retailers face an uncertain demand both in the spot and in the forward markets. Taking the
quantity bought on the forward market (qRiF ) as given, the single retailer sell the quantity qRi
to the consumers that opt for the fixed tariffs. In the spot market the uncertainty linked to the
demand is resolved, then the retailers buy (at the spot prices) the difference between the quantity
demanded by consumers that they fail to forecast in the forward market. Following Bessembinder
and Lemmon (2002), the profit equation for the retailers is:
piRi = pR ∗ qRi − pF ∗ qRiF − pW (qRi + qRiF ) (2)
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2.1.3 Producers
Producers maximise the following profit function:
piPi = pW ∗ qWi + pF ∗ qPiF − TC (3)
where i is the single producer, qW is the quantity the producers sell in the spot market (equal to
qCi plus the quantity qRi the retailers need to buy to adjust their position), qPiF is the quantity
they commit in the forward market (here taken as given) and TC are the total costs they face in
their production process, equal to
TCi = F +
a
2 ∗ q
2
Pi (4)
where F reflects the fixed costs and the quadratic (variable) component reflect the convex cost
function that characterizes the electricity markets and qPi = qPiF + qWi. 4
2.1.4 Equilibrium
2.1.4.1 Producers
We assume that qR =
∑
i qRi and qC =
∑
i qCi. And then the total quantity sold in the market
either of the peak or the off-peak product is qD = qR + qC . The optimal price and the optimal
quantities traded on the spot market are:
q∗W =
1
a
pW − qPF (5)
p∗W = a(
qD
NP
) (6)
The spot market price depends on the total quantity demanded by the market divided by the
number of producers.
2.1.4.2 Consumers
Total demand (qD) is determined exogenously by the market, and it is mainly determined by
whether and seasonality. This assumption is fairly standard and assumes that total demand is not
elastic with respect to prices.
The optimal quantity the consumers buy in the spot market is:
4The hypothesis of quadratic costs simplifies the equations of producers and allows for a closed form solutions.
A generic cost function like TCi = F + ac ∗ qcPi as in Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) adds complexity but does
not change the results.
6
q∗Ci = θ − pW (1 + λ) (7)
q∗Ci = (1 − λ)qD (8)
The quantity the consumers buy at the spot price pW is negatively related to the loss aversion
coefficient λ.
2.1.4.3 Retailers
The quantity qC results from the maximisation of consumers’utility, which depends on λ. With an
inelastic demand, the price (pW ) is determined by the supply curve (i.e. producers from and Eq.
8). Retailers decision is therefore limited to the quantity qR:
qR
NP
= 1
a
pW − 1
NP
qC
The quantity sold in the spot market depend on prices (the higher the spot prices, the more
the consumers wish to buy at the fixed price pR) and on the quantity bought on the spot market
(the higher qC , the lower qR).
2.2 Forward market
Consumers choose the quantity they buy in the spot market, and do not have an active role in
the forward market. Retailers and producers contract in this market the quantities that should be
bought and sold.
The profit equations of the producers in the forward market is:
piFPi = pW (
(qR + qC)
NP
) − F − a2 ∗ (
(qR + qC)
NP
)2 (9)
which can be obtained replacing Eq (5) in Eq (3). The objective function of the retailers is:
piFRi = pR ∗ qRi + pW ∗ qRi (10)
Following Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1993) and Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) we
assume that the objective function of the producers and the retailer is linear in expected profits,
and that the variance of the profits is known. Then the quantity the producers and the retailers
trade on the forward market is determined by:
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qP,RF =
pF − E(pW )
AV ar(pW )
+
Cov(piFP,R, pW )
V ar(pW )
(11)
2.2.1 Producers
Let us focus on the profits in the forward market for the producers, given by Eq. 9. From Eq. 3
we have that: (qR+qC)
NP
= pWa Replacing that in Eq.(9) reads:
piFPi =
(pW )2
2a − F
We can then calculate the covariance between the producer’s profits and the spot price pW and
replace that in Eq. 11:
Cov(piFPi, pW ) =
1
2aCov(p
2
W , pW ) (12)
Then Eq. 11 for producers becomes:
qPiF =
pF − E(pW )
AV ar(pW )
+
1
2aCov(p2W , pW )
V ar(pW )
(13)
2.2.2 Retailers
In our model, retailers buy forward quantities depending on the share of the electricity they can
sell in the spot market at the fixed price pR. Following Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) we
assume that:
Cov(piFRi, pW ) = pRCov(qRi, pW ) − Cov(pW qRi, pW ) (14)
Replacing Eq.14 in Eq.11
qRiF =
pF − E(pW )
AV ar(pW )
+ pRCov(qRi, pW ) − Cov(pW qRi, pW )
V ar(pW )
(15)
2.2.3 Equilibrium
In order to find the optimal forward price and, then, the optimal quantities sold and bought on
the forward markets by retailers and producers we impose that the forward market clears: (qPF and
qRF ). The market-clearing equation is:
∑
i
qRiF +
∑
i
qPiF = 0
solving that for pF , and replacing qR from Eq. (9) gives:
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pF = E(pW ) − N
P
N
1
2aCov(p
2
W , pW ) −
NR
N
pRCov(qR, pW ) +
NR
N
Cov(pW qR, pW ) (16)
Using the covariance property: Cov(p2W , pW ) = Skew(pW )+2E(pW )V ar(pW ) we rewrite Eq.16
as:
pF = E(pW ) + γSkew(pW ) + γ2E(pW )V ar(pW ) − (N
P
Na
+ (1 + λ)
N
)NRpR (17)
in which γ = 2N
R(NP+a(1+λ))−NP
2aN
The forward price is related with pR, the expected level of the spot price pW , its variance and
its skewness. The higher the skewness of the spot price, the higher the probability of getting very
high prices in the spot, so the forward price is higher. The same holds for variance: the higher the
price variability, the higher the motivation of hedging on the future markets and the higher the
forward price.
From that, we can solve Eq. 13, replace Eq. 6 and get the optimal forward position for the
producers as a function of the quantity and the prices in the spot market:
qPiF =
E(qR + qC)
NP
+ PREM
AV ar(pW )
+ 12a
Skew(pW )
V ar(pW )
1
2a
Skew(pW )
V ar(pW )
(18)
in which PREM = pF −E(pW ) as in Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). The producers want to
sell more on the forward market the higher the expected demand. Loss aversion is negatively linked
to the quantity sold forward by producers. The producers also consider the difference between the
forward price and the expected spot prices (the premium) and the variance of the spot prices. The
higher the variance, the lower the quantity sold forward. However, the variance of the spot prices
is weighted by the skewness of the spot prices. The higher the skewness of the spot price, the
higher the forward price, the higher the quantity producers want to sell in the forward market.
Solving Eq.15 we get the optimal quantity bought in the forward market by the retailers:
qRiF = −2 ∗ E(qR) +
PREM
AV ar(pW )
+ (N
P
a
+ (1 + λ))[pR − Skew(pW )
V ar(pW )
] (19)
The quantity the retailer i buy forward depends on the expected demand they face in the retail
market qR. The minus sign indicates that the retailer will take in the forward market the opposite
position from the producers. The higher pR, the higher the quantity that can be bought forward.
The quantity traded by the retailer in the forward market also is affected by the possible bias
between the forward and the spot prices (premium) and the skewness of spot prices. Consumers’
loss aversion affects the quantity traded forward by retailers: the higher the loss aversion, the lower
the quantity sold on the forward market by the retailers. Moreover, the higher the loss aversion, the
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higher qR, which (in turn) determines higher quantities bought on the forward market by retailers.
3 Testing the model
We use the equations of the model to determine how the price and the quantity in both the spot
and the forward markets change after variations in the loss aversion parameter (λ), in the number
of retailers (Nr) and in the number of producers (Np).
We calibrate our model on the Spanish economy, as the reform of the electricity prices happened
in this country in 2014 is a good test case for our model. Like in any other liberalised market,
the consumers in the Spanish electricity market are able to choose between different electricity
providers. For the consumers that did not opt for any specific provider, the former incumbent
companies offered since June 2010 the default service at a ‘default tariff”. This price was set
by a quarterly auctions mechanism, in line with other liberalised markets such as New Jersey
and Maryland using structured competitive solicitation processes to procure electricity for default
consumers (LaCasse and Wininger, 2007)5. The quarterly descending clock auctions were used to
calculate the wholesale cost for households with default contract. The resultant price was kept
fixed during the following 3 months, similarly to the Danish case, where the reference price is
calculated with the average of the relevant prices in quarterly contracts for the next quarter since
2005 (Olsen and Johnsen, 2011).
The products purchased by the last resort suppliers in the auctions were standard quarterly
forward contracts (base load and peak products) similar to those traded in the forward markets.
In this sense, according to the NRA ‘there was a strong interrelation between the resulting equilib-
rium price in the auction and the price formation in the existing forward trading venues’ (CNMC,
2014b). Implying that, from the NRA perspective, the auction-based price could be perceived as a
competitive price. In the same line, supporting the NRA perspective, Figure 2 shows the auction
prices and the evolution of future prices until the auction day during 2013, both for peak and
baseload prices.
5It is more similar to the New Jersey because in Maryland there ia a list of prices, but in Spain and New Jersey
it is a single price directly used as the the wholesale cost in the retail price.
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Figure 2: Price Auction vs. Future, 2013 (settlement price €/MWh)
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The last auction took place on 19th December 2013. A three-month base load product and
a three-month peak product were offered at this auction for the first quarter of 2014, being the
auction price, 61.83 e/MWh and 67.99 e/MWh, respectively. This auction was not validated and
the price applied to the last resort consumers in Spain changed from fixed to a mechanism in which
the consumers pay for the energy consumed valued at the spot price, facing the hourly variation of
the spot market price. Comparing the prices at delivery date for the auctions, the 6 months-futures
(which means the mean over the 6 months before delivery of the same future contract), and spot
(see Figure 3) hints on the similarities and differences in terms of levels and volatility between the
alternatives approaches. From the theoretical model we know that, loss-avers consumers compare
the wholesale price they face with the reference price to determine the relative cost they face with
the wholesale price. In this case, the reference price corresponds to the auction price (pR) and
the wholesale price is the spot market price (pW ). Therefore, the features of auctions, spot and
future prices, in terms of levels and volatility, provide an excellent setting for testing the model
and exploring the effects on markets from different levels of consumers loss aversion.
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Figure 3: Prices at delivery date (baseload)
The summary statistics, shown in Table 1, highlight that the mean of the day ahead price
is lower than the mean both of the auction and the 6 months-futures. However, the standard
deviation of the spot prices is almost 4 times higher than the standard deviation of the auction
and the future price. This relation between prices applies, in the same order of magnitude, for
both peak and off-peak period. This implies that the results from the calibration and simulation
would not show significant differences, with respect to the relevant elements of the analysis, when
using either price period. Therefore, for simplicity of exposition, in the next section we present
the analysis based on the the off-peak -baseload- prices for different markets.
Table 1: Summary statistics: spot, auction and future (6 months average), 2011-2014
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Spot price 52,602 45.59 15.97 0 113.92
Spot price (Base) 41,642 44.12 15.85 0 110.00
Spot price (Peak) 10,960 51.18 15.17 0 113.92
Auction price (Base) 28,460 52.18 4.41 45.41 61.83
Auction price (Peak) 28,460 57.84 4.24 51.95 67.99
Future (6m, Base) 52,602 48.91 4.15 41.41 54.97
Future (6m, Peak) 52,602 54.08 3.99 46.12 59.97
Spot price peak hours: 17-21. All the other hours are off-peak.
3.1 Calibration and Simulation
To calibrate the model on the Spanish market, we solve Eq. 19 replacing the values of pR, pW
and pF as in Table 1 and constraining the value of λ between 0 and 1.6 We initially assume the
6We draw 1000 replications assuming that λ has a uniform distribution. We then derive the value of the
parameter A, which in our model reflects the propensity to risk of the firms and has an average value of 0.003.
12
number of producers equal to 9, which represented 86% of total generation (CNMC, 2016), and
the number of retailers equal to 5, which covered 97% of the households demand (CNMC, 2014a).
Figure 4 shows that the quantities traded in the future market increases with λ. The more the
loss aversion increases, the more the consumers want to be insured against spot price volatility,
opting for a fixed tariff qR. As qR is positively related with the quantities the retailers buy on the
forward market, liquidity in that market increases with lambda. The same holds for the forward
price.
Figure 4: Effects from changes in the loss aversion
The link between the value of λ and the quantities traded in the forward market is particularly
interesting. Our model highlights that if consumers opt for the spot price (with λ=0), quantities
in the forward market do not go to zero, but reach their minimum level. This is because producers
need to hedge their position in the forward market against the changes in the variance and the
skewness of the spot prices, so this market does not disappear, but may experience significant
reduction in liquidity. Many works (Allaz and Vila (1993), Wolak (2000), Liski and Montero
(2006) among others) highlight how forward markets help keeping the competition in the spot
market high. Our results show that if consumers preferences point to spot pricing, liquidity in
the forward market decreases. This, in turn, may represent a challenge for the competition in the
spot market, which is usually characterized by a small amount of producers and retailers (as in
the Spanish case).
To mimic the effects on the forward market of different producers and retailers, we also inves-
tigate the effects of a shock on the number of producers and retailers. We run 1000 replications in
which first the number of producers (Np), then the number of retailers (Nr) varies between 2 to
20. Figure 5 and 6 show the effects of those shocks on the prices and the quantities traded in the
forward market.
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Figure 5: Effects from changes in the number of producers
An increase of the number of producers decreases the forward price but less than proportionally.
Also, the rise of the number of producers (and the retailers) has a positive effect on the quantity
traded in the forward market. Eq. 6 shows that the number of producers is negatively related
with the spot price (i.e. an increase of the number of producers reduces the spot price). Thus our
results show that when λ is close to zero, and consumers buy electricity at the wholesale price,
competition in both the wholesale and the forward markets may be kept high by increasing the
number of producers.
Figure 6: Effects from changes in the number of retailers
Retailers buy in the forward market (so quantities are negative). The highest the number of
retailers partecipating in the forward market, the more the quantities traded. However, changing
the number of retailers without changing the number of producers does not reduce the forward
14
price.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model to study the relations between loss-averse consumers,
retailers and producers, both in the spot and in the forward markets. Consumers in our model
may choose between fixed tariffs and the spot prices to pay for their electricity bills.
The model is calibrated on a real market case (Spain), where in 2014 the National Regulation
Authority moved the consumers that were not with a specific electricity provider from a fixed tariff
to the spot price. The announcement of the change in the tariff scheme together with the debate
on electricity prices increased the interest of Spanish consumers for the spot tariffs. We develop a
model to analyse how the consumer’ choices between fixed and spot tariffs affect the other agents.
We then simulate the behavior of the agents in the two markets, which depends on consumers loss
aversion and the number of producers and retailers.
Our model confirms the results of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), as the forward price is
positively linked to the expected spot price, its variance and skeweness. As our analysis extends
their model to the case of loss-averse consumers, we were able to identify how the loss-aversion
parameter interacts with the variable of the model. In particular, the loss-aversion of the consumers
is crucially linked with the liquidity of the electricity traded in the forward market. Loss averse
consumers increase the liquidity in the forward market, as the quantities the retailers buy and
the producers sell in the forward market are positively related with the degree of consumers’ loss
aversion.
Our model also highlights that the quantity of electricity the retailers sell forward is negatively
related with the skewness of the spot prices. On the contrary, quantity sold forward by producers
are positively related with the skewness of the spot prices (high probability of getting high prices
increase the forward sale) and with the total market demand.
The number of retailers and producers are also important in determining the price levels and
the quantity traded both in the spot and in the forward markets. In both the markets, the number
of producers is negatively related with the price levels, so increasing the number of producers
reduces both the spot and the forward prices.
Consumer’s preference should carefully be taken into account in order to avoid unintended
consequences in electricity markets. Indirect effects on the spot price caused by changes in prefer-
ences for the real-time tariffs may be offset by increasing the number of producers in the market.
However, the role of forward markets in the near future should be examined as changes in the
market design may change the role of these markets significantly.
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